וירא פינחס בן אלעזר בן אהרן הכהן ויקם מתוך העדה ויקח רמח בידו.” (במדבר כ”ה, ז’)
רש”י: “וירא פינחס – ראה מעשה ונזכר הלכה, אמר לו למשה מקובלני ממך הבועל ארמית קנאין פוגעין בו, אמר לו קריינא דאגרתא איהו ליהוי פרוונקא, מיד ויקח רומח בידו וגו
Rashi: ‘And Pinchas saw – he saw the incident and was reminded of the halacha; he said to Moshe, “I received from you that one who has relations with an aramis (non-Jew): the zealous should strike him.” Moshe said to him, “the reader of the letter should be the messenger to carry it out.” Immediately, Pinchas took the spear in his hand…’
What does Rashi mean, that Pinchas “saw the incident and was reminded of the halacha”? Of course, if a cup of milk accidentally spills into a pot of chicken soup, you will only think of the halacha after seeing what happened. But that is not what Rashi means here. Zimri had presented a Midianite princess in front of Moshe Rabbeinu and all of Klal Yisroel, and they were all crying because nobody knew what to do. In all of Klal Yisroel, not one person, not even Moshe Rabbeinu, remembered the halacha of קנאים פוגעים בו (that the zealous should strike him). And Pinchas had also forgotten. But when he saw what Zimri was doing, he remembered, which is remarkable. That is not what happens to us when milk spills into a pot of soup. If you do not remember whether the shiur bittul is 1/60th or 1/50th, you will not suddenly remember when you see the milk spill into the pot. But Pinchas saw, and he remembered.
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The key characteristic of kenaos—zealotry, is that it emerges from the person himself. If someone knows that the Mishna Berurah ( (סימן שכו states that it is ossur to immerse in a hot mikvah on Shabbos, and therefore stages a protest outside his local mikvah, that is not really kenaos. Kenaos does not descend “from above”; it begins “from below”, from within the person himself. The person sees something, and it bothers him even though he does not remember the Mishna Berura; he recognizes that something here is not right. It is for this reason that the halacha of “קנאין פוגעין בו” can be implemented when the קנאי comes to the decision oh his own, and when directed by others. (סנהדרין פב)
But this is a very tricky point. At times, we find the behavior of others offensive because of our own individual inclinations or opinions. True, these feelings originate from within the person himself, but is that a worthy kenaos—to impose ourselves on others? This is what was so noteworthy regarding Pinchas. He did not remember the halacha, yet he was pained and upset on a personal level. But that pain, as personal and subjective as it was, brought him to an objective truth: “he saw the incident and remembered the halacha”. That is an incredible feat, for the person himself, in “his reality”, to reveal Torah. Moshe refers to Pinchas as “קריינא דאגרתא “—“reader of the letter”. We find that Megillas Esther is referred to as an אגרת—a letter—and not a sefer, because in the Megillah, the truth of Torah is revealed not from above, but from within reality. Likewise, Pinchas, the קנאי, revealed the truth of Torah, not from above, but from within himself; that is also an אגרת.
Let’s say the chazzan in your minyan davens too fast, and you are up in arms. Before you crown yourself as a קנאי, ask yourself: “even if it is wrong, does it bother me, or am I only upset because of some unwritten rule that davening should take x number of minutes?” And if it really does bother you, ask yourself a second question: “is this something that everyone will agree to, or is it my own personal hangup?” If the kenaos is not coming from you, then it’s not kenaos, but if that is all it is, it’s possul. This is the challenge of kenaos: it must be deeply personal, but at the same time objective and true.